Electoral Reform In Britain

Electoral Reform In BritainElectoral clear up in britain was initiated by the elucidate act of 1867 and consequently first aside the post was chosen as the best solution. This essay is trying to exhibit whether this right to vote schema is ease fit-for-purpose and whether at that place is a chance that it whitethorn be counterchanged to a much proportionate electoral arranging. It defines purposes and foundations of the existing vote organization and tries to deduce how it works in reality. To do so it rate levels of tertiary c completelyer swan, their lay in the fantan and the full general separatrix of the electoral clay. Based on these explanations it focuses on the reasons for and against change, especially from the point of deal of the conservatives and labour, and concludes that although enlighten is possible it is very un in all probability to happen in the short-term.Is the UKs starting time Past the Post electoral system still fit-for-purpose and i s there ofttimes chance it will be changed, if non in the short-term, in the medium- to long-term?First Past the Post (FPTP) or simple plurality, as this alternating(a) name suggests, is unrivalled of the simplest and earliest mechanisms for right to vote and is widely adopted or so the world including the astronomicalst democracies, India and the USA (Sberg Shugart, 2008, p. 7). In the UK, it came to a greater extent or less(prenominal) from amalgamation of different change integrity voting systems in 1866 and was adopted for all constituencies in the Reform spiel of 1884 (Ahmed, 2010, pp. 1069-1074).This essay examines whether the First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system is able for Britains current political environment and whether there is a chance of reform in the future. In particular, it focuses on successes and failures of FPTP and contrasts it with the functions and foundations of elections. It then considers the debate in Britain about electoral reform, a d ebate that looks set to be put to the political archives once again after the Alternative Vote (AV) referendum in 2011. Finally, it argues that although FPTP has particular shortcomings in handling third troupe votes and is biased against the worldly-mindeds in the presence of political will, electoral reform is only liable(predicate) to dissipate place in the long-term.This author tries to define fit-for-purpose from the foundations of FPTP rather than based on democratic ideals much(prenominal) as fairness and proportionality. As distant as this essay is concerned, the purpose of an electoral system is to elect Members of Parliament (MPs) and in turn, the establishment and not proportional theatrical performance, as the latter is one of any(prenominal) functions that each electoral system may perform. To assess whether FPTP electoral system is fit-for-purpose, effects of it on the membership of the House of Commons should first be examined. The desirability of these eff ects or absence of some desired outcomes of a preferred electoral system would therefore define the neediness for reform.Firstly, formation the function of General elections would help to decide whether reform is indeed necessary. The arguments could by and large be divided into ii opposing ideas one that seeks to ferment the sevens a fully representative body of state-supported opinion and the new(prenominal) that puts the emphasis on the ability of the electorate to determine the next organisation. The former prefers to bring home the bacon government formation in the pass of the negotiating parties after the elections and the latter is unforced to sacrifice proportionality to provide the electorate with this election. This latter argument is one that has promoted FPTP and a system of single- companionship government, giving the cream between the governing party and the contrary to the electorate by using an electoral system that more or less guarantees an overall absolute mass to whichever party comes first in votes (Curtice, 2010, pp. 624-626). This, in early(a) words, advances a system where two largest parties alternate between government and opposition, the system that has aroundly governed Britain in the post-war era. There seems to be a desire to play along with this latter function, both historically and at present, whilst attempting to add a head of proportionality (Ahmed, 2010, pp. 1072-1074 Jenkins Commission, 1998, 9).Whether FPTP is fit for purpose or some otherwise depends solely on what is expected from it, and how far these expectations atomic number 18 met. Curtice (2010, p. 625) identifies four crucial foundations to the argument spread out in the previous paragraph based on Duvergers Law and auction block equity. The former states that FPTP opts a two-party system, making life difficult for third parties the latter tries to formulate how FPTP croupe discriminate against the second party by disproportionate award of seats to the party that has won the elections even if by a very narrow margin (Cox, 1997, pp. 13-15, 72-74). Curtice (2010, p. 625 1986, pp. 210-211) argues that a simple majority electoral system hinders support for third parties by discouraging voters and awarding those parties with smaller proportions of seats allocates more seats to the pleasant party to facilitate a majority government and at the same time awards this majority without bias to the two largest parties in different elections. These ar features of an ideal electoral system in Britain conducted under the rules of FPTP. The question is whether influence of other parameters make changed the outcome of the elections to circumvent forgets predicted by Duvergers Law and cube law (Curtice, 2010, pp. 624-626 Curtice Steed, 1986, pp. 209-213 Jenkins Commission, 1998, 3.19-3.32). allow us first consider the effects of FPTP on third party votes and allocation of seats. Curtice (2010, pp. 626-629) utilises da ta compiled by Rallings and Thrasher (2007) and shows that although until 1974 share of third party votes in General elections was compatible with predictions of Duvergers Law, since then it has gone up from an number of less than 10% in previous years to an all-time blue 34.9% of the vote . Moreover, the number of seats won by third parties in general elections has in either case increased from less than a dozen to begin with 1974 to al around 90 in 2010 (BBC News, 2010 Rallings et al., 2007). It is fair to consider that this outcome is still compatible with Duvergers Law in that their share of seats are far less than their share of votes. However, this discrimination against third parties depends on geographical ducking of their voters (Curtice, 2010, p. 629 Jenkins Commission, 1998, 3.30). A similar share of votes in 1983 only awarded them 27 seats. This change is likely to make a hung parliament more possible.Secondly, FPTP should award more seats to the winning party tha n its lead in the polls. If cube law is to operate, a 1% brush to the winning party should result in as much as 3% of seats changing hands between the winning and second parties (Duverger, 1963, p. 322). This enlarged effect that gives an easy majority in the House of Commons to the party in government is shown to be dependent on the number of marginal seats (Curtice, 2010, pp. 629-631 Curtice Steed, 1986, pp. 209-213). Ever since 1974 general election, the number of marginal seats that behave changed hands between fag out and the Conservatives has come down from over 27% to 15% at the decease general election, due to a trend towards geographical concentration of the Conservative and Labour support (Curtice Steed, 1986, pp. 209-228). Another factor that skews this further is to do with the remnant foundation described higher up that the cube law operates without bias towards any parties. Curtice (2010, pp. 633-635) demonstrates that FPTP has been treating Labour more favour ably when awarding exaggerated majorities in the new-fangled years. This bias towards Labour adds to an already reduced number of marginal seats to fail FPTP in its main goal of providing two main alternatives to the electorate.Whether there is need for reforming the electoral system for the General elections in the UK, this reform may well happen or its chances become limited based on political calculations of the party/parties in power. Under the then Labour government, The fencesitter Commission on the Voting System (Jenkins Commission) was setup in 1997 with a remit to find an alternative electoral system to conform to a list of requirements that are patient ofly based on an extension of FPTP. These requirements were (i) broad proportionality (ii) the need for stable government (iii) an extension of voter choice and (iv) the maintenance of a link between MPs and geographical constituencies (Jenkins Commission, 1998, 1.1). equivalence these requirements to the foundations of FPTP discussed above and as the requirements were not absolute one could argue that the need for a majority government would demand an exaggerated number of seats allocated to the winning party, something FPTP is already trying to achieve, and still be considered broadly proportional (Jenkins Commission, 1998, 9.18). The Jenkins Commission therefore proposed Alternative Vote (AV), another plurality voting system, plus a number of top-up seats to make it more proportional. Since AV is the best option put forward and has already been rejected by the electorate, it is hard to imagine that an electoral reform based on AV could happen anytime in the short- or medium-term.The reasons that hinder the change to the electoral system are not as numerous as they used to be over most of the twentieth century. FPTP does not provide the full bound of the exaggerative qualities it once did. Although, all major parties have mentioned reform of one benevolent or another in their latest manifes tos (2010 Party Manifestos, 2010), the level of toleration for reform amongst political parties withal depends on whether they are in government or in opposition. Political parties in opposition tend to favour electoral reform, but when a party comes to power under FPTP, they are less likely to adopt changes (Sberg Shugart, 2008, p. 47). They appreciate the advantages, namely a tight mandate and one-party majority government that are less likely to exist if a more proportionally representative electoral system were to be adopted (Dunt Stevenson, 2013). In addition to this, there are also conflicting arguments as to who is the beneficiary of reform. There is no doubt that all third parties will gain more seats under any electoral system that is more proportionally representative than FPTP. The question is which large party is going to lose. The majority of literature claims that if nothing changes apart from the voting system, e.g. number of MPs, constituency boundaries, etc., th e Conservatives are going to lose the most seats (Blau, 2008, pp. 864-866 Payne Quilty-Harper, 2011). This can partly be eliminated by redrawing boundaries and reducing the number of MPs both proposed by the coalition government but they are unlikely to have an enormous effect in addressing the discrimination towards the Conservatives (Curtice, 2010, p. 637).Besides, this same dependence of an exaggerated majority in parliament to such a small swing in votes brings government public policy to the ideological centre and encourages jurisprudence by consensus based on logical explanations by Chandler and Downs (cited in Curtice Steed, 1986, p. 211). This affects public satisfaction with the government in a positive way, since every party favours staying in power as long as possible. Because of this, public support for reform of the voting system is unlikely to be substantial.However, apart from nip groups and minority parties who mainly favour proportional representation there are several reasons wherefore larger governing parties mainly the Conservatives and Labour may favour electoral system reform. The most important and often forget reason being their attempt to defend their share of vote by adopting a more proportional system to prevent losing out to evolution support of the third parties (Dunleavy Margetts, 2005, pp. 854-855). Moreover, Blau (2008, pp. 61-63) considers three other reasons for a change from in spite of appearance proposing a popular reform and gaining votes as a result as a concession to a coalition partner and the prospect of more votes and seats owing to an electoral reform . Blau (2008, p. 63) emphasises that the first reason is the most likely way for a reform process to start, but it also needs to be self-promoting to the party to gain traction. This could be one of the reasons why electoral reform did not happen in the current government after the 2010 General elections, as Dunleavy and Margetts (2005, pp. 864-866) show the Conservatives are the least likely to gain any seats from a move to a more proportional electoral system.In considering reasons for this change, there are many other arguments that could not be expanded in this short essay. Such arguments hold among many, under-representation of women and ethnic minorities due to the great emphasis on party draw a great number of MPs being elected by plurality rather than majority of votes, prevalence of safe-seats limiting the choice for some voters, and as a result producing lower turnouts, and also no choice in electing a government and local representatives separately (Curtice, 2010 Dunleavy Margetts, 2005 Jenkins Commission, 1998, 3,4b).In addition, one should also consider the historic context where electoral system reform has been considered. As already mentioned in the beginning of this essay, many debates were held in the parliament in the latter half of the nineteenth century, for and against adoption of proportional representatio n in which FPTP has always been the outcome (Ahmed, 2010, pp. 1069-1074). This continuation of reform initiatives shows that there is a prospect of change only if it comes in the right time. This author believes that such reform is highly unlikely to take place in the short-term due to the recent AV referendum. It is also unlikely in the medium-term, as no other alternatives to AV have been proposed and large parties have little(a) incentive to implement changes. However, this situation can only improve in the long-term. Change to proportional representation has been discussed for almost 150 years and is most likely to happen when favourable conditions exist.In conclusion, change seems possible if not likely, considering that we extrapolate current voting trends into the future (Blau, 2008, pp. 85-87). Most literature discussed above is of the belief that change will happen if third parties continue winning more seats and pose a threat to the duopoly (Ahmed, 2010 Curtice, 2010, 201 2 Dunleavy, 2013 Dunleavy Margetts, 2004). It may result in a swap between the Liberal Democrats and one of the two largest parties, as happened in first half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, the prospect of a hung parliament in itself is not enough to make this change take place. Interests of large parties and MPs should also be aline with it.